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DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW
Dom. Rel. Law § 240: Support pendente lite for a child held
available in action to determine the validity of a foreign
divorce decree.
The Court of Appeals, in Langerman. v. Langerazn,6 declared
that the supreme court was without jurisdiction under the New
York State Constitution to award support pendente lite unless
there was specific statutory authorization granting such power.
The present DRL § 240 authorizes the awarding of support pendente
lite for a child in only four actions: (1) annulment or declaration
of nullity of a void marriage; (2) separation; (3) divorce;
or (4) writ of habeas corpus or petition and order to show cause
to obtain custody of, or visitation rights with, the child. In Gontaryk
v. Gontaryk,77 the appellate division, first department, held that the
supreme court was without jurisdiction to award support pendente
lite to a child in an action to determine the validity of a foreign
divorce decree, citing Langerman and noting the absence of this type
of action in DRL § 240 as authority for its decision.
Recently, however, in Vazquez v. Vazque, 78 the appellate
division, second department, ruled that the supreme court, under
its inherent equity powers, had jurisdiction to award support
pendente lite to a child in an action to declare a foreign divorce
decree invalid. The court distinguished Langerman on the ground
that that case was decided before the amendment of the New
York State Constitution.79
It would seem that, if the child requires it, support pendente
lite should be available in the same court in which the matrimonial
action is pending since, by forcing another proceeding to be
brought in another court, a great deal of time and expense would
be incurred that could be detrimental to the child's welfare. None-
theless, the fact remains that under DRL § 240 no provision is
made for the award of support in an action to determine the validity
of a foreign divorce decree. However, it is submitted that the
welfare of the child is the underlying purpose behind DRL § 240,
and that this intention can best be served by affirming the Vazquez
decision.
SURROGATE'S COURT PRocEDuRE ACT
SCPA Articles 2 and 3: Comparison with prior law.
The Temporary State Commission on the Law of Estates
was established to study the various sections of the Real Property
- 303 N.Y. 465, 104 N.E.2d 857 (1952).
77 20 App. Div. 2d 633, 246 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1st Dep't 1964).
7 26,.App. Div. 24 701, 273 N.Y.S.2d 12 (2d Dep't 1966).
79 N.Y. CONsT. art. 6, §§ 7(a), (c).
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Law, the Personal Property Law, the Decedent Estate Law, the
Surrogate's Court Act [hereinafter cited as "SCA"] and the Con-
solidated Laws in order to divide them into procedural and sub-
stantive provisions relating to surrogate's proceedings. The result
of this study was the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law [hereinafter
cited as "EPTL"] encompassing the substantive provisions and the
Surrogate's Court Procedure Act [hereinafter cited as "SCPA"]
containing the procedural aspects.
The intention of the Commission in drafting the SCPA was
to codify the law and simplify surrogate's court practice as far as
practicable. In furtherance of this objective, frequent references
have been made to the CPLR and many new sections have been
modeled after CPLR provisions. A special attempt was made to
update the provisions relating to jurisdiction in order to provide
for complete disposition of all matters related to the estates of
decedents and to avoid multiplicity of suits. Similarly, the pro-
visions relating to service of process have been modernized in order
to facilitate the court's exercise of that jurisdiction.
It is the purpose of this Survey note to examine the scope of
jurisdiction (contained in article 2) and the methods of service
(contained in article 3) under the SCPA.
Article 2-Jurisdiction
Sections 210 and 211 of the SCPA are intended to increase
the scope of the in personam jurisdiction of the surrogate's court.80
Subdivision 1 of section 210 provides that "the court shall exercise
jurisdiction over persons and property as heretofore or hereafter
permitted ... ." 8" While the term "heretofore" embodies all
the presently effective principles concerning the jurisdictional predi-
cate,82 "hereafter" provides a springboard for the expansion of
jurisdiction provided in subdivision 2.
The second subdivision of section 210, labeled "additional
bases," furnishes long-arm jurisdiction to a greater extent than
has been previously granted to any court by an American leg-
islature.83 Section 210(2) (a) empowers the court to "exercise
s0McKNNEYS SCPA § 210, Revisers' Notes.
81 SCPA § 210(1).
82 See 1 WEINSTEIN, KoRiN & MILLER, NFsv YORK CIVIL PRACICE 1 301.10
(1965). The law regarding jurisdiction of persons under the Surrogate's
Court Act is found in SCA § 41.
83This section was drawn in very broad terms. However, in
commenting on section 210, the Commission simply stated, "in per-
sonam jurisdiction is enlarged to conform with CPLR 301." Temporary
State Commission on Estates, Memorandum to Members of the New York
State Legislature, Subject: Proposed New Surrogate's Court Procedure
Act 3 (1966). Yet, section 210 is far broader than the sections of the
CPLR dealing with jurisdiction over persons.
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personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his fiduciary, as
to any matter within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court
arising from any act or omission of the non-domiciliary within the
state, either in person or through an agent." (Emphasis added.)
This section is much broader than its CPLR counterpart.
CPLR 302, except with regard to certain tortious acts,
allows the court to exercise in personam jurisdiction only
on the basis of the commission of an act within the state which
results in a cause of action. Also, CPLR 302 limits such acts to
business transactions, tortious acts or the ownership or use of
real property. The SCPA greatly extends the reach of its long-
arm statute by broadening its application to include any act or
omission pertaining to a matter within the subject matter juris-
diction of the surrogate's court. The broad language of the new
statute manifests an apparent legislative intent to have section 210
extend to the constitutional limits of long-arm jurisdiction. 4 The
courts, therefore, are faced with the task of framing the due process
limits of this new provision.
Section 211 gives the surrogate's court all the long-arm jur-
isdiction afforded the supreme court. Since Section 210 of the
SCPA is broader than CPLR 302, it would appear that section
211 serves no meaningful purpose. Any "act or omission" falling
within the purview of CPLR 302 will also fall within the broader
scope of SCPA Section 210. Perhaps the revisers feared that a
possible judicial decision rendering section 210 unconstitutional
would leave the surrogate's court without long-arn jurisdiction if
section 211 were not available to fill the void. However, an
unconstitutional application of the provision would not indicate
that the provision itself was unconstitutional, but merely that a
court had erred in going beyond the permissible limits of
jurisdiction.
The applicability of section 210 remains speculative. However,
an example might help illustrate its possible operative effects.
Under Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law,8 5 a surviving
spouse has a limited personal right to elect against the decedent's
will and thereby take the share he or she would be entitled to
in intestacy. Section 18-a(a) 86 provides that this election shall
-4When faced with the more complex provisions of CPLR 302, as
originally enacted, the New York Court of Appeals restricted that statute's
effectiveness by holding that a "tortious act within the state" does not include
the mere consequences of a tort in this state. Feathers v. McLucas, 15
N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.dZ 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). See The Biannual
Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 122, 134-38 (1965).
Apparently, SCPA § 210 was drafted in simple, broad terms to indicate that
it was intended to reach the constitutional limit.
85 This section is now included in EPTL § 5-1.1.
so EPTL § 5-1.1(b) (1) (A).
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extend to gifts causa mortis made after marriage8 - Assume
that the dying husband, while in New York, makes a gift causa
mortis of valuable jewelry to an Illinois domiciliary. The husband
then dies and the recipient of the gift returns to Illinois. Subse-
quently, the widow elects to take her intestate share. However,
the executor finds that in order to accomplish this result it will
be necessary to reclaim the jewelry now in Illinois. By applying
section 210(2) (a), the surrogate's court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over the recipient of the gift, since the action involves
a matter within its subject matter jurisdiction arising from an
act of a non-domiciliary within the state.
This example also illustrates the possible unconstitutionality of
certain applications of section 210. It is questionable whether the
forum contacts in the hypothetical case are sufficient to make "it
reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,
to require ... [defendant] to defend the particular suit brought" 8s
in New York.
A further constitutional question may arise under section
210(2) (b). Subparagraph (b) provides that a non-domiciliary who
accepts property, distributed in the administration of an estate,
submits to in personam jurisdiction in the court having jurisdiction
over the estate, as to any matter concerning that distribution, in-
cluding a proceeding to recover the property. This provision
appears to give the court personal jurisdiction in situations wherein
only quasi in rem jurisdiction would otherwise exist.
For example, assume a non-domiciliary receives a specific
bequest of valuable property. The statute provides that if the
court had jurisdiction over the property at one time, it would have
jurisdiction over the recipient years later in a proceeding to recover
it. Quasi in rem jurisdiction would result from the power of
the state over the res, presuming that the property is within the
control of the court. However, it is questionable whether the
acceptance of that property by a non-domiciliary gives the court
jurisdiction over that person as to any matter concerning* the
property received.
The addition of .long-arm jurisdiction to the powers of the
surrogate's court is desirable since it allbws the court to fully
dispose- of all matters before it. Despite the possible problems
created by the broad provisions of the new statute, the effort was
well directed for it expands the power of the court in this area
to its constitutional limits, thereby increasing its usefulness.
87 See Note, Recent Reforms in the Law of Estates, Wills aad Trusts,
40 ST. JoHx's L. REv. 230,-244-47 (1966).7
88International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S..310,-317 (1945).
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Article 3-Service of Process
It is generally agreed that the method of service best calculated
to give notice to a person over whom jurisdiction is sought is
personal service. For this reason, it is the primary method of
service both within and without the state under the SCA and
the SCPA 9 The SCA, however, limits such service outside the
jurisdiction to strictly defined situations.90 No such limitation is
presented by Section 307(1) of the SCPA which permits personal
service outside the state without a court order. However, this
method of service is tempered by SCPA § 310(2) which allows
such service only when accomplished by one of the persons designated
in CPLR 313. This limitation on parties performing personal
service outside the state must be contrasted with personal service
within the state which can be accomplished by any person over
the age of eighteen years, even though that person is a party to
the action.9
The most significant contrast between the SCA and the SCPA
is found in the provisions for substituted service. Under the SCA,
if "proper and diligent effort" fails to accomplish personal service,
the surrogate can order substituted service as defined in section
55, provided that the conditions therein are met. Thus, substituted
service upon a resident may be made if it appears that he cannot
be served anywhere in the state within a reasonable time, or if it
appears that he is evading service. 2  The method of substituted
service to be used is specifically set out in the statute, i.e., by
leaving a copy of the citation and a copy of the surrogate's
order at the residence of the respondent with a person of suitable
age, or if no such person is available, by affixing both copies
to the door of the residence and by mailing additional copies to
the respondent at the residence.93  Thus, the court is limited
to only one manner of substituted service upon a resident who
8DSCA §55; SCPA §307(1).
90A New York resident can be personally served outside the state pur.
suant to a court order issued under SCA § 56(2) when that resident cannot
be served by substituted service within the state pursuant to section 55 or
"where in the surrogate's discretion a person who is a resident of the state
but is absent therefrom should be served . . . personally or by publication."
Section 58-a provides further for personal service outside the state without
a court order, but, in such a case, the citation must be served by one of a
particular group of persons.
91 SCPA § 310(1).
92 SCA § 55. In order for substituted service to be ordered against a
person domiciled outside New York it is necessary that, at the time service
is attempted, he have a bona fide residence within the state. 1 BuTLEE NEw
YoRK SURR OGATE LAW AND PR~cricEr § 409 (1950).
93 SCA § 55. In the case of a corporation, substituted service can be
ordered by leaving a copy with a suitable person at the respondent's principal
office or place of business or by the "nail and mail" method at that locatiom
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cannot be personally served. However, upon a showing that no
such residence can be found, the court may use its discretion in
choosing a suitable method of service. Some provision is made
for service by publication outside the jurisdiction upon the court's
order, but the situations in which such an order can be given are
specifically enumerated.
4
In contrast, under Section 307(2) of the SCPA, the surrogate
is given a great deal of discretion in the choice of methods of
service. He may devise a method of service for domiciliary
natural persons upon whom personal service cannot be effected
after due diligence and for non-domiciliary respondents. Service
by court order may be provided for, as an "alternative" to personal
service within or without the state.95 The use of the word "alter-
native" seems to indicate that, except in the one instance specifically
mentioned, i.e., a domiciliary natural person, the petitioner need
not make any attempt to accomplish personal service upon the
respondent. Thus, it would seem that even though the petitioner
might know that a non-domiciliary is within the state at the time
service is sought, he may still serve him by a substituted, court-
ordered method. Such a situation could not arise under the SCA
since its provisions related to "residents" while the SCPA makes
use of the term "domiciliary." 96 Within this context, a question
seems to arise as to whether the employment of substituted service
without first attempting personal service would be reasonably cal-
culated to apprise the respondent of the pending action and give
him an opportunity to be heard.
The methods of service which the court can order under
SCPA § 307(2) are limited only by the minimum standards of
due process and the ingenuity of courts and attorneys. Five
possible methods are set out, but the section clearly states that they
"shall not . . . be exclusive." The practitioner should note, how-
ever, that the courts will probably be cautious in granting an
order for any other method than those specifically set out in the
statute. This is supported by the fact that the Revisers' Notes seem
to express the belief that the sample methods are exclusive. 7
However, the language of the statute would seem to support any
method, so long as it satisfied the constitutional due process
requirements.98
94 SCA § 56.95 SCPA § 307(2).
96 SCPA § 103(15) defines domicile as "a fixed, permanent and principal
home to which a person wherever temporarily located always intends to
return."
97 McKINNEY'S SCPA § 307, Revisers' Notes. The revisers stated that
"the methods of service by order are five in number. . ....
98 The freedom given to the surrogate's court to create methods of service
bears a close resemblance to the powers given the courts under CPLR 308(4).
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In considering service of process provisions it is well to
keep in mind the requirements of due process. The method of
service used must be reasonably calculated to give notice to an
interested party and to give him an opportunity to protect his
interests. Actual notice, however, is not mandatory. 9  The
sufficiency of notice is, at least in part, dependent upon the type
of action being instituted by the petitioner. Thus, if the pe-
titioner's action is to obtain a personal judgment against the
respondent, the notice requirements are more strict than where the
petitioner institutes an in rem action. If the petitioner's action
is in rem, attachment, plus subsequent notification, usually ac-
complished by publication, is sufficient notice, since property
is always deemed to be in the possession of the owner
or his agent. Thus, when the court devises a method of service
other than personal service, it must keep these factors in mind
so as to meet the requirements of due process.
SCPA § 307(3), providing for service upon an infant, has
remained substantially the same as the provisions of SCA § 55.
Service upon incompetents and other than natural persons
has been covered by reference to the various CPLR provisions
applicable to these categories of respondents. 00 It is notable, how-
ever, that the provision relating to incompetents (CPLR 309(b))
refers only to judicially declared incompetents. That provision
requires service upon the committee appointed to handle the in-
competent's affairs and upon the incompetent, but the court "may"
dispense with service upon the incompetent. No special provisions
are made for service upon a non-judicially declared incompetent.
Under SCA § 60, however, the surrogate has discretionary power
to appoint a person to receive a copy of the citation in the interests
of a person incapable of protecting his rights. Since the new
act does not contain a similar provision, it is possible that due
process problems will arise if service is made upon a person in-
capable of protecting his own interests. If there is no one
appointed to act in his behalf, it is possible that service upon the
incompetent alone will be insufficient to satisfy the demands of
due process.
The final provision of the SCPA service of process section
provides for service upon twenty-five or more creditors.:' Under
It is likely that the surrogates will look to decisions rendered under that
statute for possible new methods of service. It would seem imperative,
therefore, that the surrogate's court practitioner keep abreast of the develop-
ing case law of CPLR 308(4).
99 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 308.01
(1965). For a treatment of the federal due process requirements see Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
100 SCPA § 307(4).
101 SCPA § 307(5).
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SCA § 55; service upon such a group can be accomplished by
publication in newspapers for a length of time designated by the
surrogate and by mailing a copy to each creditor. The new act
provides for service without the requirement of obtaining a court
order and no longer necessitates publication. Process can be
served on such creditors whether or not they are natural domi-
ciliaries, by simply mailing a copy of the process to each of
them.The provisions of the new act make the task of the petitioner's
attorney somewhat simpler than under the SCA. In surrogate's
court actions the attorney is often faced with the task of serving
a great number of persons within and without the state. With
the great amount of power now resting in the court to devise
methods of service, the attorney can present the court with one
affidavit setting forth the facts as to each respondent and leave it
to the court to devise the best method of service for each. The
new service of process provisions also seem to be of great benefit
to the efficiency of surrogate's court proceedings. Since it is
now much easier to accomplish service, petitioner will be better
able to unite all interested parties in an action and thus settle
the matter under litigation.
